Commissioner v. Soliman: The Final Word on Defining Principal Place of Business by Soscia, Elizabeth Diane
Catholic University Law Review 
Volume 45 
Issue 1 Fall 1995 Article 9 
1995 
Commissioner v. Soliman: The Final Word on Defining Principal 
Place of Business 
Elizabeth Diane Soscia 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Elizabeth D. Soscia, Commissioner v. Soliman: The Final Word on Defining Principal Place of Business, 45 
Cath. U. L. Rev. 275 (1996). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview/vol45/iss1/9 
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Catholic University Law Review by an authorized editor of CUA Law Scholarship Repository. For more 
information, please contact edinger@law.edu. 
COMMISSIONER v. SOLIMAN: THE FINAL
WORD ON DEFINING PRINCIPAL
PLACE OF BUSINESS
It is estimated that there are more than 20 million home-based busi-
nesses in the United States.1 These taxpayers currently rely on § 280A of
the Internal Revenue Code, which permits a deduction for expenses at-
tributable to home-offices.2 Before Congress enacted § 280A, however,
the law was unclear as to whether expenses attributable to home-offices
were personal expenses, and therefore nondeductible,3 or whether such
costs were deductible business expenses.4
1. Linda Stern, The Home-Office Deduction: Don't Worry, Be Happy, HOME OFFICE
COMPUTING, Feb. 1993, at 24. The more than 20 million home-based businesses do not
include office workers who also maintain home-offices. Robert W. Wood, Revenue Ruling
94-24, Notice 93-12, and the Post-Soliman Blues, 21 J. REAL EST. TAX'N 334 (1994) (stating
that with the large number of home-based businesses, it is surprising that Soliman did not
generate greater controversy).
2. I.R.C. § 280A(a) (1988). The Code states, in part, that "[e]xcept as otherwise pro-
vided in this section, . . . no deduction otherwise allowable under this chapter shall- be
allowed with respect to the use of a dwelling unit which is used by the taxpayer during the
taxable year as a residence." Id. Section 280A(c)(1) adds:
Subsection (a) shall not apply to any item to the extent such item is allocable to a
portion of the dwelling unit which is exclusively used on a regular basis -
(A) the principal place of business for any trade or business of the taxpayer,
(B) as a place of business which is used by patients, clients, or customers in
meeting or dealing with the taxpayer in the normal course of his trade or busi-
ness, or
(C) in the case of a separate structure which is not attached to the dwelling
unit, in connection with the taxpayer's trade or business.
In the case of an employee, the preceding sentence shall apply only if the exclu-
sive use referred to in the preceding sentence is for the convenience of his
employer.
Id. A home-office deduction permits a business or taxpayer to deduct expenses that are
directly attributable to his business. See I.R.C. § 280A(c) (West 1993). It is estimated that
only four million of the estimated 20 million Americans who work at home take the deduc-
tion, with the remaining number reluctant to take it for fear of an IRS audit. Stem, supra
note 1, at 24.
3. See I.R.C. § 262(a) (1988) (providing, in part, that "no deduction shall be allowed
for personal, living, or family expenses").
4. See Mark Levine, Note, Home Office Deductions: Deserving Taxpayers Finally
Get a Break, 45 TAX LAW. 247 (1991). The author stated that:
[amn individual taxpayer who must maintain an office, but has no place to do so
other than in his home, is typically faced with three hurdles when deducting his
home office expenses: the broad and seemingly preclusive language of section
Catholic University Law Review
This confusion originated when Congress enacted § 162 of the Internal
Revenue Code,5 a very broad statutory provision that purportedly distin-
guished nondeductible personal expenses from deductible business ex-
penses. 6 The United States Tax Court, in its interpretation of § 162,
established a test that permitted the deduction of home-office expenses if
they were "appropriate and helpful" to the taxpayer's trade or business.7
The Internal Revenue Service, on the other hand, favored a more strict
interpretation of § 162 and, hence, issued a Revenue Ruling8 that allowed
home-office expenses to be deducted only when an employer required
that an employee maintain an office in his home.9
280A of the Code, the restrictive interpretation of that section by the [Internal
Revenue] Service, and conflicting decisional tests for that interpretation.
Id. (footnote omitted); compare Rev. Rul. 62-180, 1962-2 C.B. 52 (allowing a home-office
business deduction only when the home-office is required by the employer) with I.R.C.
§ 162 (1954) (allowing deductions for all ordinary and necessary business expenses) and
Newi v. Commissioner, 28 T.C.M. (CCH) 686 (1969) (allowing deductions for home-office
expenses if appropriate and helpful to the taxpayer's trade or business), aff'd, 432 F.2d 998
(2d Cir. 1970), and superseded by statute as stated in Commissioner v. Soliman, 113 S. Ct.
701 (1993).
5. I.R.C. § 162 (1988). Prior to enacting § 280A, courts utilized § 162 of the Internal
Revenue Code to determine whether a taxpayer's home-office expenses were deductible.
C. David Watson, An Analysis of "Meeting or Dealing" for Home Office Deductions, 1984
U. ILL. L. REv. 1075, 1077. However, this statutory provision led to taxpayer abuse and
court confusion, and ultimately led Congress to enact § 280A. Id. at 1077-79.
6. I.R.C. § 162 (1988) (stating, in pertinent part, that "[t]here shall be allowed as a
deduction all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year
in carrying on any trade or business"); see Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687, 689-90
(1966) (defining "ordinary" business expenses as those not incurred in the acquisition of a
capital asset); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 113 (1933) (implying that an "ordinary"
business expense is a necessary business expense not capital in nature); see infra notes 55-
63 and accompanying text (discussing the case law defining "necessary" business expenses
as those that were appropriate and helpful to the taxpayer's business).
7. See Bodzin v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 820, 825-26 (1973) (applying the "appropri-
ate and helpful" test), rev'd, 509 F.2d 679 (4th Cir.), and cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975);
Newi v. Commissioner, 28 T.C.M. (CCH) 686 (1969) (same), aff'd, 432 F.2d 998 (2d Cir.
1970), and superseded by statute as stated in Commissioner v. Soliman, 113 S. Ct. 701
(1993); see infra notes 51-67 and accompanying text (discussing the appropriate and helpful
test). The appropriate and helpful test liberally interpreted § 162 of the Internal Revenue
Code. See Tellier, 383 U.S. at 689 (interpreting "ordinary" and "necessary" as requiring
only that the expense be appropriate and helpful to the taxpayer's business activities).
8. Rev. Rul. 62-180, 1962-2 C.B. 52. The Revenue Ruling provides that:
[A]n employee who, as a condition of his employment, is required to provide his
own space and facilities for performance of his duties and regularly uses a portion
of his personal residence for that purpose may deduct a pro rata portion of the
expenses of maintenance and depreciation on his residence.
Id.
9. Id. Prior to adopting the more liberal appropriate and helpful test, the Tax Court
originally enforced the Revenue Ruling. Davis v. Commissioner, 38 T.C. 175, 178-80
(1962), vacated, unpublished op. (9th Cir. 1964). In Davis, a college professor built a room
over the garage of his home. Id. at 177. Davis used the study to prepare lectures, grade
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In an effort to provide more definitive rules regarding the deductibility
of home-office business expenses, Congress enacted 26 U.S.C. § 280A. 10
This section disallows deductions for business expenses attributable to a
taxpayer's home-office except in those situations where the taxpayer uses
the home-office as a principal place of business,'1 or as a place to meet
patients or clients,'12 or where the home-office is a separate structure.'
3
Although § 280A provided significantly more guidance in the area of
home-office expense deductions, neither § 280A nor its legislative history
provided much guidance in determining whether a taxpayer's home-office
qualified as a "principal place of business."' 4
Because Congress failed to adequately define principal place of busi-
ness in § 280A, the Tax Court and the various circuit courts employed
different tests to make this determination.' 5 The United States Supreme
exams, and to meet occasionally with students. Id. Still, the Tax Court found no evidence
that Davis maintained this home-office as an employment requirement. Id. at 180. Thus,
the court denied the deduction because the expenses were not ordinary and necessary. Id.
10. The Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (1976) (codified as
26 U.S.C. § 280A).
11. I.R.C. § 280A (c)(1)(A) (1988) (allowing a deduction if the taxpayer's home-office
is used as "the principal place of business for any trade or business of the taxpayer").
12. Id. § 280A (c)(1)(B) (allowing a home-office deduction if the home-office is used
as a place of business to meet patients, clients, or customers during the normal course of
the taxpayer's business).
13. Id. § 280A (c)(1)(C) (allowing a deduction if the home-office is a separate struc-
ture, not attached to the taxpayer's home, used to carry out the taxpayer's business). Con-
gress did not enact § 280A to supersede § 162 but rather established it to work in
conjunction with § 162. S. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 144 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3439, 3576. The legislative history states:
In any case involving the business use of a personal residence, it must be estab-
lished that the expenses were incurred in carrying on a trade or business (sec.
162) or for the production of income (sec. 212). Thus, there must be some rela-
tively clear connection between the activities conducted in the home and a trade
or business or the production of income.
Id. at 3576-77. Thus, to deduct a business expense incurred in the home, the expense must
be an ordinary and necessary business expense in addition to being a deductible home-
office expense under § 280A. Id.; see infra notes 14-16 and accompanying text (describing
permissible § 280A home-office business deductions).
14. See I.R.C. § 280A (c)(1)(A). To deduct expenses in connection with business use
of the home, Congress required that the relevant portion of the home be used exclusively
as the taxpayer's principal place of business. H.R. REP. No. 658, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 160-
61 (1975), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2897, 3053-54; S. REp. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 148 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3439, 3581. This provision prevents a
taxpayer from receiving a home-office deduction when he uses only a portion of a room to
conduct business. Id.
15. See infra notes 79-99 and accompanying text (describing the Tax Court "focal
point" test which allows a home-office deduction if the home-office is the place where the
income is generated or the services or goods are rendered); infra notes 100-18 and accom-
panying text (demonstrating the federal circuits' "dominant portion of the work" test
which grants a home-office deduction if the home-office is the place where the work is
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Court granted certiorari in Commissioner v. Soliman'6 to determine the
appropriate standard for deciding whether a home-office qualifies as a
principal place of business and concluded that the proper standard for
examining a taxpayer's principal place of business requires a comparative
analysis of the activities performed at each business location and the time
spent at each business location.
17
In Soliman, the respondent, Nader E. Soliman, an anesthesiologist,
spent approximately thirty to thirty-five hours per week at several hospi-
tals administering anesthesia and caring for patients. 8 Because the hos-
pitals did not provide Soliman with an office, he converted a spare
bedroom in his home into an office, where he spent approximately ten to
fifteen hours per week performing various administrative tasks in connec-
tion with his occupation. 9 On his 1983 federal income tax return,
Soliman deducted the expenses attributable to his home-office.
20
The Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service disallowed
Soliman's deduction for home-office expenses. The Commissioner rea-
soned that Soliman did not meet the requirements of § 280A because the
home-office was not Soliman's principal place of business. 2' The Tax
Court reversed the Commissioner's ruling and held that Soliman's home-
office was his principal place of business and thus the deduction should be
allowed.22 The Tax Court held that the facts and circumstances of each
case determine whether a taxpayer's home-office qualifies as a principal
place of business.23 Applying the facts and circumstances of Soliman, the
predominantly performed); infra notes 119-33 and accompanying text (discussing the
"facts and circumstances" test which permits a home-office deduction if the home-office is
essential to the taxpayer's business; a substantial amount of time is spent in the home-
office; and no other location is available to perform the office functions of the business).
16. 113 S. Ct. 701 (1993).
17. Id. at 707-08.
18. Id. at 704. Soliman worked at Shady Grove Hospital in Rockville, Maryland, Sub-
urban Hospital in Bethesda, Maryland, and Loudon Memorial Hospital in Leesburg, Vir-
ginia. Soliman v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 20, 21 (1990), aff'd, 935 F.2d 52 (4th Cir. 1991),
rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 701 (1993).
19. Soliman, 113 S. Ct. at 704. The various administrative tasks performed included
"contacting patients, surgeons, and hospitals by telephone; maintaining billing records and
patient logs; preparing for treatments and presentations; satisfying continuing medical edu-
cation requirements; and reading medical journals and books." Id.
20. Id. Soliman deducted portions of his condominium fees, utilities, and depreciation
attributable to the home-office. Id. Because he regarded his home-office as his principal
place of business, Soliman argued that he qualified for a § 280A home-office deduction.
Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.; Soliman, 94 T.C. at 29. The Tax Court found that Soliman's practice as an
anesthesiologist was "headquartered" in his home-office. Id.
23. Id. at 25. The Tax Court deemed review of the following factors important when
determining a taxpayer's principal place of business: (1) whether the functions performed
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Tax Court decided that Soliman's business involved both rendering medi-
cal services and performing administrative functions, and that the home-
office was the only place where he could properly perform the adminis-
trative tasks.24
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the
decision of the Tax Court,25 concluding that the principal place of busi-
ness will be determined by considering not only the place where the tax-
payer generates income or meets clients, but also the place that is deemed
the "true headquarters" of the taxpayer's business.26 In addition, the
Fourth Circuit agreed that the "facts and circumstances" test articulated
by the Tax Court should be liberally applied in the taxpayer's favor to
find that the principal place of business is the home-office.27
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari 28 and held that
the facts and circumstances test inadequately defined principal place of
business because it did not address whether the taxpayer's home-office is
more significant than any other place where the taxpayer conducts busi-
ness.29 The majority insisted that the phrase "principal place of business"
in § 280A compels a comparative analysis of the taxpayer's various busi-
in the home-office are essential to the conduct of the business; (2) whether the taxpayer
spends a substantial amount of time in the home-office; and (3) whether suitable office
space is available outside the home-office. Id. at 27-28. These three criteria distinguish the
dominant portion of the work test from the facts and circumstances test. Levine, supra
note 4, at 257 (noting that the dominant portion of the work test "measure[s] exclusively in
terms of hours"); see infra notes 100-18 and accompanying text (discussing the dominant
portion of the work test which will allow a home-office deduction if that is the place where
the work is predominantly performed).
24. Soliman, 94 T.C. at 26. The Tax Court determined that "[b]oth functions were
equally essential to a successful medical practice." Id.
25. Soliman v. Commissioner, 935 F.2d 52, 55 (4th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 701
(1993). The Fourth Circuit held that "where management or administrative activities are
essential to the taxpayer's trade or business and the only available office space is in the
taxpayer's home, the 'home office' can be his 'principal place of business.' " Id. at 54.
26. Id. at 55 (holding that the " 'facts and circumstances' test does not eviscerate the
requirements of section 280A, but simply replaces the inflexible and potentially unjust 'fo-
cal point' test"); see infra notes 79-99 and accompanying text (discussing the "focal point"
test).
27. Soliman, 935 F.2d at 54-55; see John K. Benintendi, Note, I.R.C. Section 280A -
Business Use of a Personal Residence - The Supreme Court's Latest Decision Bringing the
House Down on Home Office Deductions - A Purely Revenue Producing Decision, 18
DAYTON L. REV. 835, 860 (1993) (quoting Prop. Treas. Reg. 1.280A-2(b)(3), 48 Fed. Reg.
at 33,324). The author notes that the facts and circumstances test "reflects the same policy
that undergirds the IRS's proposed regulation .... The regulation provides that salesper-
sons can deduct expenses from a home office even though they spend most of their time on
the road as long as they spend a 'substantial amount of time on paperwork at home' ". Id.
28. Commissioner v. Soliman, 503 U.S. 935 (1992).
29. Commissioner v. Soliman, 113 S. Ct. 701, 706 (1993).
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ness locations-an analysis the Fourth Circuit failed to undertake.3" The
Court denied Soliman a home-office deduction because, in comparing the
relative importance of Soliman's activities at the various locations and the
time spent at these locations, the hospitals qualified as Soliman's princi-
pal place of business.31
Justice Thomas, in a concurring opinion, agreed that Soliman's home-
office did not qualify as his principal place of business. 32 He wrote sepa-
rately, however, to assert that the "focal point" test, which defines a tax-
payer's principal place of business as that place where goods are
delivered, services are rendered, or income is generated,33 provided a
more reliable method for determining whether a taxpayer's home-office
qualified as a principal place of business.34 In those few instances where
it is difficult to ascertain the focal point of a taxpayer's activities because
more than one location is used to render services or deliver goods, how-
ever, Justice Thomas advocated application of the facts and circumstances
test.
Justice Stevens, in dissent, criticized the majority's test, asserting that it
failed to provide a proper interpretation of § 280A.3 6 Justice Stevens ar-
gued that the majority interpretation injects the "meeting patients" ex-
ception in § 280A with the "principal place of business" exception, thus
30. Id. Justice Kennedy held that the common sense meaning of "principal" suggests a
comparative analysis of business locations. Id. The majority required that two primary
considerations be given substantial weight in a comparative analysis to determine whether
a home-office qualifies as a taxpayer's principal place of business: (1) the relative impor-
tance of the activities performed at each of the taxpayer's business locations; and (2) the
time spent at each location. Id. "Principal" is defined as "[cihief; leading; most important
or considerable; primary; original." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1192 (6th ed. 1990).
31. Soliman, 113 S. Ct. at 708 (disallowing a deduction for expenses attributable to the
home-office after concluding that the professional services performed at the hospitals were
the "essence" of Soliman's activities and finding that Soliman spent more time at the hospi-
tals than at the home-office).
32. Id. at 711 (Thomas, J., concurring). Although Justice Thomas and Justice Scalia
agreed with the majority's determination that Soliman did not qualify for a home-office
deduction, they disagreed with the majority's comparative analysis and instead favored the
focal point test. Id.
33. Id. at 709 (citing Baie v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 105, 109-10 (1980), aff'd, 919 F.2d
1273 (7th Cir. 1990)); see infra notes 79-99 (applying the focal point test and allowing a
home-office deduction if that is the place where the income is generated, services are ren-
dered, or goods are delivered).
34. Soliman, 113 S. Ct. at 709 (Thomas, J., concurring) (stating that the focal point test
"provides a clear, reliable method for determining whether a taxpayer's home office is his
'principal place of business' "); see also infra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
35. Soliman, 113 S. Ct. at 709 (Thomas, J., concurring) (concluding that the facts and
circumstances test should be applied "in the small minority of cases where the home office
is one of several locations where goods or services are delivered, and thus also one of the
multiple locations where income is generated").
36. Id. at 711 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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eliminating the principal place of business exception.37 Therefore, Justice
Stevens advocated the application of the facts and circumstances test em-
ployed by the Tax Court and the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals to de-
termine whether a home-office expenditure may be deducted." Justice
Stevens declared that the test employed by the majority created further
uncertainty and unfairness to taxpayers who maintain home-offices and
meet the conditions set forth in § 280A.3 9
This Note analyzes whether the Supreme Court succeeded in defining
which factors and tests should be applied in determining a taxpayer's
principal place of business. First, this Note examines the judicial treat-
ment of home-office expenses through application of the "appropriate
and helpful" test, which was employed prior to the enactment of § 280A.
Second, this Note analyzes the various tests implemented by the Tax
Court and the federal circuit courts to aid in the interpretation of § 280A.
Third, this Note reviews the Supreme Court's decision in Commissioner
v. Soliman4° and concludes that the majority opinion fails to provide an
appropriate standard for determining whether a home-office qualifies as
a principal place of business. Fourth, this Note suggests that the standard
applied in Soliman will perplex taxpayers and further encumber the
courts. Finally, this Note advocates the adoption of the facts and circum-
stances test because it provides the clearest interpretation of § 280A and
it affords favorable tax treatment to taxpayers with valid home-office
expenses.
I. WHAT CONSTITUTES A PRINCIPAL PLACE OF BUSINESS?: THE
STRUGGLE BETWEEN THE COURTS AND CONGRESS
A. Prior to Enactment of § 280A
Between 1969 and 1975, the Internal Revenue Service and the courts
employed § 162 of the Internal Revenue Code4 to determine whether a
taxpayer could deduct home-office expenses. 42 Interpreting § 162, the In-
37. Id. at 714. Justice Stevens stated that the analysis undertaken by the majority "en-
courages the misapplication of a relatively simple provision of the Revenue Code." Id.
38. See id. at 715 (Stevens, J., dissenting); infra notes 171-72 and accompanying text
(arguing that the facts and circumstances test requires a taxpayer to make a strict showing
of exclusive and regular use of a home-office and comports with congressional intent in
enacting § 280A).
39. Soliman, 113 S. Ct. at 715 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
40. 113 S. Ct. 701 (1993).
41. I.R.C. § 162 (1988).
42. Id. The pertinent portion of § 162 states: "There shall be allowed as a deduction
all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying
on any trade or business." Id. § 162(a). Courts have defined ordinary and necessary ex-
penses as those that are "common and accepted" within the business community to which
19951
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ternal Revenue Service consistently applied a strict standard that allowed
deductions only in those instances where an employer required that an
office be maintained in the employee's home.43 The Tax Court, on the
other hand, was neither as consistent nor as strict as the Internal Revenue
Service in interpreting § 162.44
In 1962, the Tax Court applied the standard supported by the Internal
Revenue Service when it disallowed a deduction for expenses attributable
to an English professor's home-office.45 In Davis v. Commissioner,46 the
Tax Court held that, because the professor's employer provided him with
work space at his place of employment, the school did not require the
professor to maintain an office at home; thus, the expenses incurred in
building the home-office were not an ordinary and necessary business
expense.47
the taxpayer belongs. Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 114 (1933). Ordinary and neces-
sary expenses are those that conform to the "ways of conduct and the forms of speech
prevailing in the business world." Id. at 115.
43. Rev. Rul. 62-180, 1962-2 C.B. 52-53. The ruling stated:
An employee who, as a condition of his employment, is required to provide his
own space and facilities for performance of his duties and regularly uses a portion
of his personal residence for that purpose may deduct a pro rata portion of the
expenses of maintenance and depreciation on his residence.
The burden of proof rests upon the taxpayer to establish (1) that, as a condition
of his employment, he is required to provide his own space and facilities for per-
formance of some of his duties, (2) that he regularly uses a part of his personal
residence for that purpose, (3) the portion of his personal residence which is so
used, (4) the extent of such use, and (5) the pro rata portion of the depreciation
and expenses for maintaining his residence which is properly attributable to such
use.
Id. The success of the revenue ruling was short lived. See, e.g., Bischoff v. Commissioner,
25 T.C.M. (CCH) 538, 539 (1966) (holding that an appropriate and helpful expenditure is
deductible). In this case, the taxpayer was an executive working as a commercial artist in a
New York advertising agency. Id. at 538. Although not required to do so by his employer,
the taxpayer maintained an office at home. Id. at 539. The Tax Court allowed the deduc-
tion because the expenditures were appropriate and helpful in the conduct of the tax-
payer's business. Id.
44. Compare Davis v. Commissioner, 38 T.C. 175, 178-80 (1962) (disallowing a home-
office deduction because the petitioner's employer did not require the taxpayer to main-
tain a home-office) vacated, unpublished op. (9th Cir. 1964); with Peiss v. Commissioner,
40 T.C. 78, 83-84 (1963) (allowing the petitioner's home-office deduction despite the fact
that his employer did not require him to maintain a home-office) acq., 1968-2 C.B. 2; and
Newi v. Commissioner, 28 T.C.M. (CCH) 686, 689-91 (1969) (applying the appropriate and
helpful test rather than inquiring whether the employer required the taxpayer to maintain
a home-office), aff'd, 432 F.2d 998 (2d Cir. 1970), and superseded by statute as stated in
Commissioner v. Soliman, 113 S. Ct. 701 (1993).
45. Davis, 38 T.C. at 179-80.
46. 38 T.C. 175 (1962).
47. Id. at 180. The dissent, however, argued that the applicable test is not whether the
expenditures were required, but rather whether it was" 'appropriate' or 'helpful' and prox-
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One year later, however, in Peiss v. Commissioner,48 a case substan-
tially similar to Davis, the Tax Court strayed from the Internal Revenue
Service's interpretation of § 162 and applied a more liberal interpreta-
tion.49 In Peiss, the Tax Court allowed a professor's deduction for ex-
penses attributable to his home-office, holding that the evidence
established that the expenses incurred were ordinary and necessary busi-
ness expenses under § 162.50
The Tax Court later established its own test, the "appropriate and help-
ful" test, in Newi v. Commissioner."' The petitioner, a salesman, main-
tained a study in one room of his apartment even though his employer
did not require him to do so.52 The Commissioner disallowed the peti-
tioner's deduction of expenses attributable to the study because the ex-
penses were not ordinary and necessary business expenses and because
the study was not a condition of the petitioner's employment.53
The Tax Court refuted the Commissioner's arguments in holding that
expenses did not have to be "required" to qualify as deductible business
expenses.54 The court held that interpreting the word "necessary", as it
applies to § 162, only requires that the expenditure be appropriate and
imately related to the taxpayer's trade or business." Id. at 186 (Raum, J., dissenting). The
dissent found it appropriate that the petitioner would maintain a home-office to prepare
lectures, grade papers, and meet students. Id. at 187.
48. 40 T.C. 78 (1963).
49. See Peiss, 40 T.C. at 82-84 (relying on the weight of evidence introduced by the
petitioner in making its determination), acq. 1968-2 C.B. 2. The petitioner, an associate
professor of physiology, used a room in his home to meet students, prepare lectures, and
perform a substantial amount of research. Id. at 80.
50. Id. at 84. Because these facts were so similar to those of Davis, the Tax Court was
expected to deny Peiss's deduction. Bryna Lee Rosen, Note, The Home Office Deduction
Game: Will Soliman v. Commissioner Return the Taxpayer to Square One?, 12 VA. TAX
REV. 141, 145 (1992). Professor Peiss, like the professor in Davis, had an office at school
but argued that he could not perform his duties solely at the school office. Peiss, 40 T.C. at
83-84. Peiss argued that his school office was difficult to use because it was "not separated
from the research laboratory ... [which] was in constant use by the graduate students." Id.
at 80. Instead of denying Peiss a deduction, like the Tax Court did previously in Davis, the
court held that the evidence was "adequate" to allow the deduction as an ordinary and
necessary business expense. Id. at 84.
51. 28 T.C.M. (CCH) 686 (1969).
52. Id. at 688. The petitioner was an outside salesman of television time for the Amer-
ican Broadcasting Company television network. Id. at 687. He spent approximately three
hours per day in his home-office performing work related activities, including reviewing
notes on the day's selling activities, studying various research materials and ratings, and
viewing the television advertisements of his company and competing networks. Id. at 688.
The study was never used for personal television viewing or entertaining. Id.
53. Id. The expenses attributable to the study included rent, cleaning, and lighting
costs. Id.
54. Id. at 691.
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helpful to the taxpayer's business.55 Because the study was appropriate
and helpful to the petitioner's business, the court concluded that the ex-
penses attributable to the study were deductible as ordinary and neces-
sary business expenses.56 The Second Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's
decision, holding that rent and other expenses attributable to a taxpayer's
home-office were deductible business expenses.57
The Tax Court applied the appropriate and helpful test again in Bodzin
v. Commissioner.58 The petitioner, a government attorney, maintained a
home-office even though his employer did not require him to do so and
despite the fact that the petitioner had access to his work office at any
time.59 The petitioner occasionally found it more convenient and more
efficient to bring his work home rather than stay late at his downtown
office.6" In determining the deductibility of home-office expenses, the
court held that the applicable test was whether the maintenance of the
home-office was appropriate and helpful to the taxpayer's business.61
Notwithstanding the fact that duplicate facilities were provided by the
employer,62 the court concluded that the petitioner's expenditures were
55. Id. (holding that the "Supreme Court has indicated on more than one occasion
that the term 'necessary' imposes only the minimal requirement that the contested expen-
diture be 'appropriate and helpful' to the taxpayer's business"); see also Commissioner v.
Tellier, 383 U.S. 687, 689 (1966) (stating that the term "necessary" has been consistently
construed as imposing only a minimal requirement that the expense be appropriate and
helpful for the development of the taxpayer's business). The court, in Newi, rejected the
"required by the employer" standard argued by the IRS and favored the "appropriate and
helpful" standard argued by the taxpayer. Newi, 28 T.C.M. at 691.
56. Id. The court held that the study was appropriate and helpful to the petitioner's
business as an outside salesman and was used regularly and exclusively by the petitioner
for business purposes, thus allowing a home-office deduction. Id.
57. Newi v. Commissioner, 432 F.2d 998, 1000 (2d Cir. 1970), superseded by statute as
stated in Commissioner v. Soliman, 113 S. Ct. 701 (1993). Although the Commissioner
argued that the appropriate and helpful standard utilized by the Tax Court " 'would open
the doors for a business deduction to any employee who would voluntarily choose to en-
gage in an activity at home which conceivably could be helpful to his employer's busi-
ness,'" the Second Circuit dismissed this concern. Id. at 1000 (quoting the Commissioner's
Brief, pp. 11-12).
58. 60 T.C. 820 (1973), rev'd, 509 F.2d 679 (4th Cir.), and cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825
(1975).
59. Id. at 822-24. The petitioner spent approximately two to three nights each week
and three to five hours each weekend in his home-office. Id. at 823.
60. Id. Although the petitioner occasionally used the home-office for personal rea-
sons, the petitioner spent the majority of his time working on cases, reading about recent
developments in the law, and preparing for upcoming conferences. Id.
61. Id. at 825. In reviewing the record, the court found that the home-office expenses
were directly related to the petitioner's business, and that the expenses were "necessary"
because they were appropriate and helpful to the taxpayer in conducting his business. Id.
at 826.
62. Id. at 824 (suggesting that the petitioner could have worked in his Internal Reve-
nue Service office in the evenings, on weekends, and during holidays because the building
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deductible because they were appropriate and helpful to his business.63
The court did not consider convenience to the petitioner a sufficient fac-
tor in determining whether the home-office expenditures met the appro-
priate and helpful test.' The United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit reversed the Tax Court's decision 65 finding that, in some
situations, personal choice dictated where the petitioner performed his
work.66 Therefore, the costs attributable to his residence were nonde-
ductible personal expenditures.
67
B. Courts Employ Various Tests to Define Principal Place of Business
After Enactment of § 280A
Because the Second Circuit and the Fourth Circuit split on whether
home-office expenses were deductible, Congress decided to address the
issue and attempt to resolve the conflict. 68 Congress disapproved of the
appropriate and helpful test, finding that it increased administrative
problems because the test involved a subjective determination by each
taxpayer of the time spent performing business activities and the time
spent performing personal activities. 69 Concern also existed in that the
appropriate and helpful test promoted taxpayer abuse because expenses
normally considered nondeductible personal expenses could be deducted
was open at all times to those employees having proper security clearance and identifica-
tion; petitioner had both clearance and identification).
63. Id. at 826.
64. Id.
65. Bodzin v. Commissioner, 509 F.2d 679 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825
(1975).
66. Id. at 681. The Fourth Circuit held that "like most lawyers and judges, [Bodzin]
sometimes, by choice, did some of his reading and writing at home." Id.
67. Id. Because these expenses were personal, the Fourth Circuit did not address what
the appropriate standard would be in those instances where the court found both personal
and business use of a residence. See Benintendi, supra note 27, at 842 (noting that because
the taxpayer was denied a deduction pursuant to § 262, which disallows deductions for
personal expenses, it was unnecessary for the court to determine whether the contested
expenditures were appropriate and helpful).
68. H.R. REP. No. 658, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 160 (1975), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2897, 3053; S. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 147 (1976), reprinted in
1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3439, 3579.
69. H.R. REP. No. 658, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 160 (1975), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2897, 3053-54; S. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 147 (1976), reprinted in
1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3439, 3579-80 (finding that the" 'appropriate and helpful' test increases
the inherent administrative problems because both business and personal uses of the resi-
dence are involved and substantiation of the time used for each of these activities is clearly
a subjective determination"); see also Cadwallader v. Commissioner, 919 F.2d 1273, 1275
(7th Cir. 1990) (holding that the appropriate and helpful test is "so fuzzy a standard, tax-
payers could claim the deduction on the flimsiest of grounds with no fear of a fraud pen-
alty, and thus could pocket a tax savings except in the unlikely event of an audit").
1995]
Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 45:275
as business expenses merely because they were appropriate and helpful in
developing the taxpayer's business.70
As a result of this concern, Congress enacted 26 U.S.C. § 280A. 71 As a
general rule, § 280A(a) provides that a taxpayer cannot deduct any busi-
ness expenses incurred in a taxpayer's dwelling unit when that dwelling is
used as a residence.72 Congress, however, provided three exceptions to
this general rule thereby allowing deductions for certain business uses of
a taxpayer's residence.73 One of the exceptions provides that if a portion
of the taxpayer's residence is used exclusively and regularly as the tax-
payer's principal place of business, expenses attributable to that portion
of the taxpayer's residence will be deductible.74 Although § 280A pro-
vided more definitive rules in the area of home-office deductions, the
statute failed to define principal place of business either in the statutory
provision itself or in the legislative history.75
70. H.R. REP. No. 658, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 160, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3054;
S. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 147, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3580. Congress
stated that "expenses otherwise considered nondeductible personal, living, and family ex-
penses might be converted into deductible business expenses simply because, under the
facts of the particular case, it was appropriate and helpful to perform some portion of the
taxpayer's business in his personal residence." Id. Both the House Ways and Means Com-
mittee and the Senate Finance Committee cited Bodzin and noted that "it is not clear
which standard would be applied in the Fourth Circuit in a case in which the court found
both personal and business use of a residence." H.R. REP. No. 658, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
158, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3052; S. REp. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 145, re-
printed in U.S.C.C.A.N. 3577.
71. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520, 1569-72 (codified at 26
U.S.C. § 280A (1988)).
72. I.R.C. § 280A(a) (1988) (stating that "no deduction otherwise allowable under this
chapter shall be allowed with respect to the use of a dwelling unit which is used by the
taxpayer during the taxable year as a residence").
73. Id. § 280A(c)(1).
74. Id. § 280A(c)(1)(A); see Kenneth F. Abramowicz, et al, Reflections on Post-
Soliman Home Office Deductions, 27 ARK. Bus. & ECON. REv. 1, 3-4 (1994) (stating that
the difficulties in interpreting the language and intent of § 280A arise when the taxpayer
does not use the home office to meet patients or clients or does not have a separate struc-
ture, and the taxpayer must therefore rely on the principal place of business exception). In
addition to the principal place of business exception, § 280A provides that if a portion of
the taxpayer's residence is used exclusively and regularly as a place to meet patients, cus-
tomers, or clients, a deduction will be allowed for expenses attributable to that portion of
the taxpayer's home. I.R.C. § 280A(c)(1)(B). Similarly, if a separate structure, not at-
tached to the taxpayer's residence, is maintained exclusively and regularly for the tax-
payer's business, expenses attributable to this structure may be deducted. Id.
§ 280A(c)(1)(C).
75. Id. § 280A (c)(1)(A); see also H.R. REP. No. 658, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 160 (1975),
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2897, 3054; S. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. 147 (1976),
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3439, 3580 (failing to provide guidance in determining what
constitutes a taxpayer's principal place of business).
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In determining what constituted a taxpayer's principal place of busi-
ness, the Tax Court employed the strict focal point test.7 6 Unlike the Tax
Court's application of the focal point test, the Second and Seventh Cir-
cuits applied the "dominant portion of the work" test, which resulted in
more favorable treatment of the taxpayer. 7 Upon reexamination, the
Tax Court replaced the focal point test with the less stringent facts and
circumstances test which allowed for home-office expense deductions
when the taxpayer satisfied certain requirements.78
1. The Focal Point Test
The Tax Court had initial difficulty in interpreting the principal place of
business exception because the statute and the legislative history pro-
vided no guidelines as to its interpretation. 79 The Tax Court formulated
the focal point test in an effort to provide an appropriate interpretation of
the principal place of business exception to § 280A.8" Under the focal
76. See infra notes 79-99 and accompanying text (discussing the focal point test). The
Tax Court opined that the focal point of a taxpayer's business, and thus his principal place
of business, is that place where the goods are delivered, services are rendered, or income is
generated. Green v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 428 (1982), rev'd, 707 F.2d 404 (9th Cir. 1983);
Baie v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 105 (1980).
77. See infra notes 102-18 and accompanying text (noting that the Second Circuit and
the Seventh Circuit, although conceding that the focal point test was easier to apply and
less subjective than pre-§ 280A standards, held that the focal point test was unfair to tax-
payers and failed to consider where the taxpayer's work was predominantly performed).
78. See infra notes 119-33 and accompanying text (discussing the facts and circum-
stances test which allows a taxpayer to qualify under § 280A(c)(1)(A) if the home-office is
the principal place of business).
79. See Malat v. Riddell, 383 U.S. 569 (1966). The Supreme Court held that under
I.R.C. § 1221(1), the word "primarily" is to be interpreted as meaning "of first importance"
or "principally." Id. at 572. The IRS interpreted the term to mean the place where most of
the taxpayer's business occurs "regardless of the number of business activities in which the
taxpayer may be engaged." 45 Fed. Reg. 52,399, 52,403 (1980). Under this proposed regu-
lation, a taxpayer could engage in more than one trade or business, but could only claim
one principal place of business for all activities. Id.
80. See Curphey v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 766 (1980). The petitioner in Curphey was
a dermatologist who owned several rental properties and was employed by a hospital. Id.
at 767-68. The petitioner used one room in his home exclusively as an office. Id. at 768.
The Internal Revenue Service denied the petitioner a deduction, arguing that the hospital
was the petitioner's principal place of business because that was where he spent most of his
time and earned most of his money. Id. at 767. The Tax Court, however, held that the
home-office qualified as the petitioner's principal place of business regarding his real estate
dealings. Id. at 776. The court held that the principal place of business exception of
§ 280A "requires a determination as to whether, with respect to a particular business con-
ducted by a taxpayer, the home office was his principal place for conducting that business."
Id. Thus, a taxpayer may have more than one principal place of business depending on the
number of business activities in which the taxpayer is involved. Id.
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point test, a taxpayer's principal place of business is that place where
services are rendered or income is generated.8'
In Baie v. Commissioner,8 2 the petitioner operated a foodstand, called
the "Gay Dog," approximately one mile from her residence.83 Because
the foodstand was too small to prepare the food, the petitioner found it
necessary to prepare the food in the kitchen of her residence.8 The
petitioner also used a second bedroom in her home as an office that was
used exclusively in connection with the foodstand operation.
8 5
The Tax Court denied the petitioner a deduction for the expenses at-
tributable to the spare bedroom as well as expenses incurred in the
kitchen, holding that the petitioner failed to qualify under one of the enu-
merated exceptions of § 280A.86 The petitioner argued, however, that
the rooms in her home used in connection with the "Gay Dog" consti-
tuted her principal place of business, thus triggering § 280A(c)(1)(A).87
The Tax Court rejected this argument and concluded that because Con-
gress failed to provide any guidance in defining principal place of busi-
ness, the focal point of a taxpayer's activities adequately determined a
taxpayer's principal place of business.88
Applying the focal point test to the facts of Baie, the Tax Court held
that the foodstand constituted the focal point of the petitioner's activities
because it was where she sold the food and generated income.89
Although the court found preparation of the food and maintenance of the
books to be necessary for the continued efficient operation of the food-
81. See Baie v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 105, 109-10 (1980); see also Benintendi, supra
note 27, at 848 (stating that this was the first case to apply the focal point test).
82. 74 T.C. 105 (1980).
83. Id. at 106.
84. Id. The kitchen, when not used to prepare food for the foodstand, was used to
prepare food for the petitioner and her family. Id.
85. Id. The petitioner used the office to maintain the bookkeeping and other
paperwork of the foodstand operation. Id.
86. Id. at 111. Specifically, the taxpayer's kitchen and office did not meet the principal
place of business exception because the focal point of the taxpayer's activities were at the
foodstand- that is where the income was generated. Id. at 109-10. In addition, the tax-
payer did not use the kitchen or office as a place to meet customers-the customers went
to the foodstand. See id. at 106. Lastly, the kitchen and office failed the third exception
because neither room was a separate structure unattached to the taxpayer's home. See id.
at 107.
87. Id. at 109.
88. Id. The Court stated, though, that "what Congress had in mind was the focal point
of a taxpayer's activities, which, in the case before us, would be the [foodstand] itself." Id.
89. Id. at 109-10.
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stand, the court determined that the focal point of the petitioner's busi-
ness operation was the "Gay Dog" foodstand.90
Two years later, the Tax Court applied the focal point test again in
Drucker v. Commissioner.91 The taxpayer was a concert violinist em-
ployed by the Metropolitan Opera Association, Inc. to perform at Lin-
coln Center.92 Because the Metropolitan Opera did not provide its
musicians with practice facilities, the petitioner set aside a room in his
apartment and used it exclusively as a music studio for musical study and
practice. 93 Indeed, the petitioner spent more time practicing in his studio
than he did performing at Lincoln Center.
94
The Tax Court held that although the petitioner spent more hours prac-
ticing than performing, Lincoln Center constituted the focal point of his
activities. 95 The Court conceded that it was essential for the petitioner to
practice to retain his job, but found that performing at Lincoln Center at
designated times was the only requirement of his employment. 96 Thus,
the deduction for expenses attributable to the home music studio was
disallowed because the studio could not be termed the petitioner's princi-
pal place of business.97
90. Id. at 110. The Tax Court noted that the petitioner could not invoke § 280A even
if she did meet one of the enumerated exceptions because she did not satisfy the exclu-
sively requirement of § 280A(c)(1). Id. at n.7. Specifically, the court noted that her
kitchen was used for both personal and business purposes. Id. Although the bookkeeping
room was used exclusively for business, it did not constitute the principal place of business
because it was not the focal point of the foodstand's business operations. Id.
91. Drucker v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 605 (1982), rev'd, 715 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1983).
Other notable cases in which the Tax Court applied the focal point test include Jackson v.
Commissioner, 76 T.C. 696 (1981) (holding that a real estate agent's principal place of
business was her employer's office); Pomarantz v. Commissioner, 52 T.C.M. (CCH) 599
(1986) (holding that the focal point of the physician's activities was the hospital because
that was where he spent the majority of his time), aff'd, 860 F.2d 960 (9th Cir. 1988).
92. Drucker, 79 T.C. at 606.
93. Id. at 608-09.
94. Id. at 606-07. The petitioner spent approximately 15 hours per week performing
at the Lincoln Center and approximately 30 hours per week practicing in his home studio.
Id. at 607-09.
95. Id. at 614 (holding that although the home studio was appropriate and helpful, the
focal point of petitioner's activities was on the employer's premises).
96. Id. at 613. Although recognizing the importance of practicing, the court held that
from both the employer's perspective and the petitioner's perspective, the focal point or
the principal place of the job was Lincoln Center. Id. at 613-14.
97. Id. at 615. Justice Wilbur filed a dissenting opinion arguing that the "retention of
[the petitioner's] job depended on the quality of his playing at rehearsals as well as at the
public performances." Id. at 621 (emphasis omitted) (Wilbur, J., dissenting). Justice Wil-
bur examined all the "facts and circumstances" to determine the petitioner's principal
place of business and argued that the "intense and continuous individual practice on a
year-round basis [was] the most important contributing factor to petitioner's success as a
19951
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Although the focal point test comports with congressional intent in dis-
allowing deductions for expenses that are essentially personal and unre-
lated to the taxpayer's business, it denies deductions to taxpayers who are
engaged in professions that require the taxpayer to maintain a home-of-
fice and perform duties elsewhere.9" In other words, taxpayers whose
occupations do not fit neatly within the focal point test are denied deduc-
tions for valid expenses incurred in home-offices that should qualify as a
principal place of business. 9
concert musician." Id. at 621-22. Thus, Justice Wilbur argued that the petitioner's home
studio should qualify as the petitioner's principal place of business. Id. at 623 n.8.
98. See Jackson v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 696 (1981). The Tax Court held that the
petitioner, a real estate agent, failed to prove that her home-office was her principal place
of business and not just a helpful convenience. Id. at 700. The evidence established that
her employer's office was the source of most of her business activities because that was
where she first came in contact with her clients. Id. Although the taxpayer argued that
client contact also occurred in her home, the court held that not enough evidence was
introduced to show that the home-office was regularly used as a place to meet clients. Id.;
see also Pomarantz v. Commissioner, 52 T.C.M. (CCH) 599 (1986), aff'd, 860 F.2d 960 (9th
Cir. 1988); Green v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 428 (1982), rev'd, 707 F.2d 404 (9th Cir. 1983).
In Pomarantz, the petitioner, a physician specializing in emergency medical care and work-
ing through a professional service corporation, provided services to Riverton General Hos-
pital in Seattle. Pomarantz, 52 T.C.M. at 600. Because the hospital did not provide him an
office, Dr. Pomarantz maintained a home-office over his garage where he kept business
records, a desk, a chair, a telephone, filing cabinets and bookshelves. Id. The Tax Court
disallowed his home-office deduction holding that the home-office was not his principal
place of business because the time spent at the hospital treating patients outweighed the
time spent in the home-office. Id. at 602. The court further held that the work performed
at the hospital was more important than the work done in the home-office. Id.
In Green, the petitioner, and manager of seven condominiums spent a good part of his
day in the field. Green, 78 T.C. at 429-30. The petitioner maintained a home-office to
receive work related phone calls he missed during the day while he was in the field. Id. at
430. Although the taxpayer spent equal time at both his work office and his home-office,
the Tax Court denied the home-office deduction holding that the focal point of the tax-
payer's activities was his work office because that is where he filled out his paperwork and
performed his most important duties. Id. at 433; see Dudley v. Commissioner, 54 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1288, 1291 (1987) (holding that the focal point of the petitioner's business activities
was where he taught), aff'd, 860 F.2d 1078 (6th Cir. 1988); Lopkoff v. Commissioner, 45
T.C.M. (CCH) 256, 257-58 (1982) (holding that the focal point of an administrative assis-
tant at the Veterans Administration was the hospital); Trussel v. Commissioner, 45 T.C.M.
(CCH) 190, 192 (1982) (holding that the focal point of a judge's business activities was the
courtroom); Moskovit v. Commissioner, 44 T.C.M. (CCH) 859, 861 (1982) (holding the
focal point of a professor's job was the university where he taught).
99. See Weissman v. Commissioner, 751 F.2d 512, 514 (2d Cir. 1984) (concluding that
the focal point test is inadequate because it places attention on the place where the work is
most visible, and not where the majority of the work is completed); see also Levine, supra
note 4, at 259. Examples of occupations that would not satisfy the focal point test include
artists, musicians, writers, and those who handle business activities in their home but who
also engage in significant business activity elsewhere. Id.
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2. The Dominant Portion of the Work Test
Many appellate courts rejected the focal point test, finding it an inade-
quate interpretation of § 280A(c)(1)(A), particularly in situations where
the taxpayer's job involved several distinct activities. 100 Instead of apply-
ing the focal point test, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit and the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit adopted the dominant portion of the work test, which placed
great emphasis on the amount of time the taxpayer spent at the home-
office. 101
In Drucker v. Commissioner, °2 the Second Circuit reversed the Tax
Court's holding that the appellant's focal point of activity or principal
place of business was Lincoln Center.0 3 Without specifically stating that
it was applying the dominant portion of the work test,1' 4 the court held
that only the appellant's practice at home made the work performed at
Lincoln Center possible."0 5 Use of the home studio was more than a con-
venience to the appellant, it was a business necessity to his continued
employment as a musician, and thus, the court allowed a deduction for
expenses attributable to the home music studio.' 6
100. See, e.g., Meiers v. Commissioner, 782 F.2d 75, 79 (7th Cir. 1986) (rejecting the
focal point test); Weissman, 751 F.2d at 514 (rejecting the focal point because it "creates a
risk of shifting attention to the place where a taxpayer's work is more visible, instead of the
place where the dominant portion of his work is accomplished"); Drucker, 715 F.2d at 69
(rejecting the focal point test). Although criticized by the appellate courts, the Tax Court
consistently applied this test to identify the taxpayer's principal place of business. See infra
note 101 and accompanying text.
101. See infra notes 102-06 and accompanying text (discussing Drucker v. Commis-
sioner and the court's holding that because the taxpayer spent more time in his home-
office practicing, that was his principal place of business); infra notes 107-11 and accompa-
nying text (analyzing the court's decision in Weissman v. Commissioner which held that
because the taxpayer spent the majority of his time in his home-office researching and
writing, this was where the dominant portion of the taxpayers work was performed); infra
notes 112-18 and accompanying text (analyzing the court's holding in Meiers v, Commis-
sioner where it was determined that the taxpayer's principal place of business is where the
taxpayer's work is predominantly performed).
102. 715 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1983).
103. Id. at 69.
104. See id. The Second Circuit held that the focal point of the musician's activities, in
terms of both time and importance, was at the musician's home studio. Id.
105. Id. The Second Circuit adopted the reasoning of Justice Wilbur's dissenting opin-
ion in the Tax Court's opinion. See supra note 97 (discussing Justice Wilbur's dissent and
his argument that an examination of the facts and circumstances is required to determine a
taxpayer's principal place of business).
106. Drucker, 715 F.2d at 69-70. The Court noted that the mere fact that there was an
element of personal convenience would not preclude a finding that the music studio was a
business expense. Id. Thus, the court's holding is consistent with the legislative history
and the congressional intent of § 280A because it prevents a nondeductible personal ex-
pense from being converted into a deductible personal expense. Id. at 69.
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The Second Circuit applied the dominant portion of the work test again
in Weissman v. Commissioner.10 7 In Weissman, the petitioner, an associ-
ate professor of philosophy, was required to research and write in his
field to retain his teaching position.'08 To comply with this requirement,
he spent approximately twenty percent of his time at campus teaching
and the remaining eighty percent in his home-office, where he did the
majority of his research and writing."0 9
The Second Circuit refused to apply the Tax Court's focal point test,
and criticized the test as focusing more attention on the visible location of
the taxpayer's work and less attention on the location where the domi-
nant portion of the taxpayer's work was actually performed." ° The Sec-
ond Circuit held that because the petitioner spent the majority of his time
in his home-office researching and writing, the dominant portion of his
work took place in this office, thus qualifying it as his principal place of
business."11
The Seventh Circuit, in Meiers v. Commissioner,' 2 also rejected the
Tax Court's focal point test and followed the Second Circuit's application
of the dominant portion of the work test to determine what constituted a
taxpayer's principal place of business." 3 There, the petitioner spent ap-
proximately one hour per day at the laundromat facility she owned and
two hours per day in a home-office used exclusively for drafting em-
ployee work schedules and maintaining the laundromat's books.'1 4 Re-
jecting the Tax Court's application of the focal point test,"15 the Seventh
Circuit held that the emphasis should be on where the taxpayer's work is
primarily performed, even if that is not the same place where the goods
107. 751 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1984).
108. Id. at 513. In addition to Weissman's research and writing requirements, the peti-
tioner also met with students, prepared lectures, and graded exams. Id.
109. Id. Although the petitioner was more visible on campus when he was teaching, his
occupation involved other distinct yet related activities, including researching and writing.
Id. at 514.
110. Id. Specifically, the court held that the focal point test "creates a risk of shifting
attention to the place where a taxpayer's work is more visible, instead of the place where
the dominant portion of his work is accomplished." Id. The court found that "the Tax
Court focused too much on Professor Weissman's title and too little on his activities." Id.
The Second Circuit further noted that the Tax Court erred as a matter of law "by failing to
consider all aspects of his activities." Id.
111. Id. at 515.
112. 782 F.2d 75 (7th Cir. 1986).
113. Id. at 79.
114. Id. at 76. While at the laundromat, the petitioner would meet with employees,
collect the money from the laundry machines, and provide customer assistance. Id.
115. Meiers v. Commissioner, 49 T.C.M. (CCH) 136,138 (1984), rev'd, 782 F.2d 75 (7th
Cir. 1986).
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and services are rendered, or the income is generated.116 Considering the
length of time spent at each location to be the primary factor in determin-
ing where the work was primarily performed, the Seventh Circuit con-
cluded that the appellant spent the dominant portion of her time and
work in the home-office carrying out her chief function as manager of the
laundromat. l 17 Thus, the court considered the home-office the principal
place of business and expenses attributable to the office were deductible
under § 280A. 118
3. The Facts and Circumstances Test
The Tax Court re-examined the focal point test after the Second and
Seventh Circuits rejected the test's application because of its failure to
interpret § 280A(c)(1)(A) properly. 119 Because the focal point test
merged the principal place of business exception under § 280A(c)(1)(A)
into the meeting patients exception under § 280A(c)(1)(B), the Tax Court
subsequently followed suit and rejected the focal point test.
120
116. Meiers, 782 F.2d at 79. The Seventh Circuit stated, "[wie, like the Second Circuit,
question the usefulness of the focal point test .... we do not believe this approach is fair to
taxpayers or carries out in the most appropriate way the apparent intent of Congress." Id.
117. Id. The Seventh Circuit, like the Second Circuit, viewed the focal point test as
focusing excessively on "visible" activity, rather than on where the dominant portion of the
taxpayer's work was performed. Id. The Seventh Circuit developed a test substantially
similar to the Second Circuit:
In determining the taxpayer's principal place of business, we think a major con-
sideration ought to be the length of time the taxpayer spends in the home office
as opposed to other locations. But time spent is not necessarily the only consider-
ation. There are other factors, which may from time to time weigh in the balance,
such as the importance of the business functions performed by the taxpayer in the
home office; the business necessity of maintaining a home office; and the expendi-
tures of the taxpayer to establish a home office.
Id. (citations omitted).
118. Id.
119. See supra notes 102-18 and accompanying text (discussing the Second and Seventh
Circuits' rejection of the focal point test and enactment of the dominant portion of the
work test).
120. Kahaku v. Commissioner, 58 T.C.M. (CCH) 1247, 1249 (1990). The Tax Court
reexamined the focal point test because of the existence of cases in which administration of
the business is essential to the taxpayer's business and the taxpayer's home provides the
only available office space. Id.; see James A. Fellows, Current Status of Home Office De-
ductions Needs Clarification, 72 J. TAX'N 332, 334 (1990). The article explains the reason
for the court's abandoning the focal point test:
Since the focal point of a taxpayer's business is where goods and services are
transferred to customers, a taxpayer's home is the principal place of business only
if he or she regularly meets the customers at the home office. Thus, as the Tax
Court correctly points out, the focal point test merges the principal place of busi-
ness exception under Section 280A(c)(1)(A) into the meeting of clients exception
under Section 280(A)(c)(1)(B) [sic]. The effect is the de facto elimination of the
19951
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The Tax Court replaced the focal point test with the facts and circum-
stances test and deemed the following factors important in determining
whether a taxpayer's home-office qualified as a principal place of busi-
ness: (1) whether the functions performed in the home-office are essential
to the conduct of the business; (2) whether the taxpayer spends a substan-
tial amount of time in the home-office; and (3) whether suitable office
space is available outside the home-office. 121
In Kahaku v. Commissioner,122 the Tax Court applied the facts and
circumstances test and held that the petitioner could deduct business ex-
penses incurred in his home-office. 123 Because the petitioner, a profes-
sional solo guitarist, was not allowed to practice at the restaurant where
he was employed, he set aside a room in his home which was used exclu-
sively as an office and studio.'24 The court held that the activities per-
formed at the home-office and studio, including practicing the guitar and
maintaining business records, were essential to the petitioner's work as a
musician.' 21 In addition, the court held that in spending thirty hours per
week in the office and studio, the petitioner satisfied the requirement that
he spend a substantial amount of time in the home-office.' 26 Lastly, be-
cause the restaurant did not permit the petitioner to practice at work or
maintain an office at the restaurant, the court found that he had no place
to practice the guitar and manage his business other than his home.1 27
principal place of business exception from the Code. To restore this exception, it
is necessary to apply a different standard.
I
121. See Kahaku, 58 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1249; see Levine, supra note 4, at 256. These
three criteria are considered a major distinction between the dominant portion of the work
test and the facts and circumstances test. Id. at 254-56. Courts that applied the dominant
portion of the work test considered other factors important, such as (1) the importance of
the business functions performed in the home-office; (2) the business necessity in maintain-
ing a home-office; and (3) the expenditures of the taxpayer to establish a home-office.
Meiers, 782 F.2d at 79; see Levine, supra note 4, at 255-56 (noting that another distinction
between the facts and circumstances test and the dominant portion of the work test is that
the facts and circumstances test places less emphasis on the amount of time a taxpayer
spends in the home-office).
122. 58 T.C.M. (CCH) 1247 (1990).
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1249. As a solo guitarist, the petitioner would play two to three nights per
week for a total of four hours during each night's performance. Id. The petitioner prac-
ticed approximately 30 hours per week in the home studio. Id. He also used the home
studio to record music, listen to music, and maintain all business records. Id.
125. Id. (finding that to maintain his business as a guitarist, "it was essential for Leroy
[Kahaku] to keep abreast of current music and to record practice sessions on tape which
could be studied and supplied to potential customers").
126. Id.; see Fellows, supra note 120, at 335 (noting that the Kahaku opinion is distinct
because it was written by one of the chief dissenters of the Soliman Tax Court decision).
127. Kahaku, 58 T.C.M. at 1249.
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Similarly, the Tax Court applied the facts and circumstances test in Mc-
Donald v. Commissioner,28 where the petitioner, an owner and operator
of a television, radio, and stereo repair shop, deducted expenses for a
home-office used to store business files and other work-related docu-
ments.129 The Tax Court denied the deduction after "considering all the
facts and circumstances,"1 30 holding that the home-office was "incidental
and secondary"'13 to the repair shop where the petitioner actually carried
out his business.' 32 Because the evidence showed that the repair shop
was essential to the petitioner's business and that he spent substantial
time there, the court concluded that the repair shop, not the home-office,
qualified as the petitioner's principal place of business.'
33
II. COMMISSIONER V. SOLIMAA. A NEW STANDARD FOR
DETERMINING A TAXPAYER'S PRINCIPAL PLACE
OF BUSINESS
In Commissioner v. Soliman,134 the Supreme Court addressed "the ap-
propriate standard for determining whether an office in the taxpayer's
home qualifies as his 'principal place of business' under 26 U.S.C.
§ 280A(c)(1)(a).' 35 At trial, the Tax Court ruled that where the tax-
payer's administrative activities differ from his income generating activi-
ties, the place where the taxpayer executes those administrative activities
can constitute the taxpayer's principal place of business.' 36 The Tax
Court, applying the facts and circumstances test, held that Soliman's
home-office was his principal place of business because it was essential to
128. 61 T.C.M. (CCH) 1876 (1991); see also Shore v. Commissioner, 59 T.C.M. (CCH)
762, 765 (1990) (holding that the petitioner failed to satisfy the criteria of the facts and
circumstances test), aff'd, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 26835 (6th Cir. Nov. 7, 1991).
129. McDonald, 61 T.C.M. at 1877. The petitioner's wife worked for the repair shop on
a part time basis and spent much of her time in the home-office doing the bookkeeping,
paying bills, and preparing the employee payroll. Id. The petitioner's wife worked out of
the home-office because the shop space was limited. Id.
130. Id. at 1878.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. The court held that "[w]hile [the McDonald's] home office was obviously a
function of their business, it was clearly incidental and secondary to the commercial loca-
tion, where all the repair work was done, where customers reported to deliver and pick up
their merchandise, and where the business was conducted." Id.
134. Commissioner v. Soliman, 113 S. Ct. 701 (1993).
135. Id. at 703.
136. Soliman v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 20, 25 (1990) (holding that "where a taxpayer's
occupation requires essential organizational and management activities that are distinct
from those that generate income, the place where the business is managed can be the
principal place of business"), aff'd, 935 F.2d 52 (4th Cir. 1991), and rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 701
(1993).
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conducting his business, he spent a substantial amount of time in the
home-office, and no other suitable office space was available other than
the home-office. 137 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's decision, holding that a taxpayer's princi-
pal place of business can be determined by considering not only the place
where the taxpayer generates income or meets clients, but also the place
that is deemed the "true headquarters" of the taxpayer's business. 138
The Supreme Court reversed the Tax Court and the Fourth Circuit and
established two criteria for determining a taxpayer's principal place of
business: a comparative analysis of the relative importance of the activi-
ties performed at each business location,139 and the time spent at each
location. 4° The dissent advocated the facts and circumstances test that
the Tax Court and the Fourth Circuit applied because it provided a more
consistent interpretation of § 280A and afforded more favorable treat-
ment to taxpayers who incur valid business expenses in the home-
office.14'
137. Id. at 28-29. The Tax Court further indicated that it would no longer follow its
opinion in Drucker v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 605 (1982), rev'd, 715 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1983).
Soliman, 94 T.C. at 29. Judge Ruwe dissented from the Tax Court's opinion after conclud-
ing that the court should apply the test used by the Second and Seventh Circuits. Id. at 41
(Ruwe, J., dissenting). Applying the Second and Seventh Circuits' test would require
courts to determine the place where the dominant portion of the taxpayer's work is accom-
plished. Id. To determine if the home-office is where the dominant portion of the tax-
payer's work is completed, Judge Ruwe recommended evaluating the time spent in the
home-office and the importance of the activities performed in the home-office. Id. at 35.
Judge Nims also filed a dissenting opinion, advocating a modified focal point test be
applied in those situations where the home-office was the focal point of a taxpayer's activi-
ties in the context of time and importance. Id. at 32 (Nims, C.J., dissenting). He argued
that the facts and circumstances test "takes us all the way back to square oneJi.e., to the
situation which existed even before Congress took what it thought would be the remedial
action of section 280A." Id. at 33.
138. Soliman v. Commissioner, 935 F.2d 52, 55 (4th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 701
(1993). Judge Phillips dissented, arguing that a comparison of the time spent at each loca-
tion should be performed when the taxpayer engages in business at more than one loca-
tion. Id. at 55-56 (Phillips, J., dissenting). Judge Phillips would have denied Soliman a
deduction because the majority of his time was spent at the hospitals, where he performed
his most important function, giving anesthesia to patients. Id. at 56.
139. Soliman, 113 S. Ct. at 706.
140. Id. The Supreme Court refused to apply the Fourth Circuit's facts and circum-
stances test because it "failed to undertake a comparative analysis of the various business
locations of the taxpayer in deciding whether the home office was the principal place of
business." Id. at 703-04; see Brian J. McMillin, Comment, A New Standard of Deductibility
for Home Office Expenses, 27 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 318, 324-25 (1993) (stating that "[t]he
Court reasoned that the facts and circumstances approach employed by the lower courts
focused solely on activities in the home office and therefore lacked the requisite compara-
tive analysis of all the various locations of business-related activity").
141. Soliman, 113 S. Ct. at 715 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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A. The Majority: A Comparative Analysis
Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court which held that in
determining a taxpayer's principal place of business, the term "principal"
compels a comparative analysis of the taxpayer's various business loca-
tions. 4 ' In performing this analysis, the majority held that two primary
considerations were critically important to determining whether a home-
office qualified as a taxpayer's principal place of business. 143 These two
factors are the relative importance of the taxpayer's activities performed
at the various business locations and the time spent at each location.
144
As a preliminary step to analyzing the relative importance of the activi-
ties performed at each location, the Court suggested performing an over-
all objective description of the business in question, which would likely
reveal a pattern of more significant activities. 145 Although the majority
recognized that a business location where this pattern occurs may indi-
cate a focal point of the business, the majority reiterated that no one test
is determinative.' 46 The majority did admit, however, that principal con-
sideration should be given to the place where goods are delivered or serv-
ices are rendered to determine where the most important functions are
performed. 4 7
The majority disagreed with the Fourth Circuit regarding the weight
that should be given to the necessity of the functions performed at
home. 4 8 The majority held that although the necessity of a taxpayer's
business activities performed in the home-office is relevant in ascertain-
ing whether a taxpayer's home-office qualifies as a principal place of busi-
142. Id. at 706. Justice Kennedy noted that the six judges who dissented in the Tax
Court decision criticized the majority for failing to perform a comparative analysis of
Soliman's business locations to determine the principal place of business. Id. at 704. In
interpreting the term "principal", Justice Kennedy looked to the "ordinary, everyday
senses" of the words. Id. at 705-06 (citations omitted). The majority criticized the facts
and circumstances test employed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit because it failed to discern whether the taxpayer's home-office was, in fact, the
principal place of the taxpayer's business as compared to the taxpayer's other business
locations. Id. at 706. The Court did concede, however, that the ultimate determination of
a taxpayer's principal place of business would necessarily depend on "the particular facts
of each case." Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. The Court conceded, however, that "we cannot develop an objective formula
that yields a clear answer in every case." Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. (finding that the phrase "focal point" has a "metaphorical quality that can be
misleading").
147. Id.
148. Id. at 707. Although the majority found the planning and preparation for an activ-
ity important, the Court held that "in integrated transactions, all steps are essential." Id.
19951
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ness, it is not a controlling factor. 149 The majority also rejected the
Fourth Circuit's assertion that the availability of alternative office space
should be considered, finding this proposition irrelevant in determining a
taxpayer's principal place of business.
150
The Soliman majority held that the respondent's treatment of his pa-
tients was the essence of his professional services and noted that this
treatment was more important and more significant than the tasks he per-
formed at his home-office.' 5' Comparing the time spent at each of the
business locations, the majority held that because significantly more time
was spent at the hospital, it should be regarded as his principal place of
business.
152
B. The Concurrence: Defender of the Focal Point Test
Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, concurred with the judgment
of the majority in denying Soliman's deduction for expenses attributable
to the home-office.' 53 Although Justice Thomas agreed with the result
reached by the majority, he attacked the majority's test as extremely bur-
densome, arguing that an inquiry into the relative importance of the ac-
tivities performed at each location and the time spent at each location
"will unnecessarily require the lower courts to conduct full-blown eviden-
tiary hearings each time the Commissioner challenges a deduction under
§ 280A(c)(1)(A)."' 54 Justice Thomas, expressing concern over applica-
tion of the majority's test, questioned whether the two primary considera-
149. Id. The Court stated that "[e]ssentiality ... is but part of the assessment of the
relative importance of the functions performed at each of the competing locations." Id.
150. Id. The Court stated that the availability of alternative office space has no bearing
in determining whether a home-office qualifies as a taxpayer's principal place of business.
Id. Instead, the Court held that availability of alternative office space should be used to
determine whether the taxpayer is using the home-office for the convenience of the em-
ployer. Id.
151. Id. at 708. Before concluding, the Court briefly addressed the second part of their
test-comparing the amount of time spent at home with the amount of time spent at other
business locations. Id. at 707. The Court held that this element becomes more important
when the relative importance of the activities factor yields no definitive answer regarding a
taxpayer's principal place of business. Id. The Court further held that there may be cases
where no location qualifies as a principal place of business and that in those instances,
courts should not strain to call a location a principal place of business simply because no
other location seems to qualify. Id. at 707-08.
152. Id. at 708. The majority compared the 10 to 15 hours worked in the office at
respondent's residence with the 30 to 35 hours worked at the hospital in concluding that
the hospital was the respondent's principal place of business. Id.
153. Id. at 709 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun also wrote a concurring
opinion in which he agreed with the majority that the phrase "principal place of business"
compels a comparative analysis of a taxpayer's various business locations. Id. at 708
(Blackmun, J., concurring).
154. Id. at 709 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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tions of the majority's test were of equal significance or whether the time
element applied only if the relative importance of the activities element
rendered no definitive answer.
155
Justice Thomas favored application of the focal point test. 156 He sug-
gested that the majority opinion, instead of rejecting the focal point test,
actually utilized the focal point test in its analysis when it stated that great
weight must be given to the places where most of the important functions
are performed.' 57 Conceding that no one test is determinative, Justice
Thomas asserted that in those cases where the focal point test provides no
definitive answer, the facts and circumstances test guided by the two pri-
mary considerations expounded by the majority should be employed to
determine whether a taxpayer's home qualifies as his principal place of
business.'
58
C. The Dissent: Proponent of the Facts and Circumstances Test
Justice Stevens dissented, asserting that the respondent's ordinary and
necessary business expenses were questioned only because he incurred
these expenses in an office that was located in the respondent's home.' 59
This results in the unequal treatment of otherwise similarly situated tax-
payers, which the dissent suggested was not what Congress intended.'
60
155. Id.
156. Id. Justice Thomas wrote that "the 'focal point' test ... provides a clear, reliable
method for determining whether a taxpayer's home office is his 'principal place of busi-
ness.' " Id.
157. Id. Justice Thomas emphasized the majority's statement that "the place where
goods are delivered or services rendered must be given 'great weight in determining the
place where the most important functions are performed.' " Id.
158. Id. at 710. For example, in those cases where the home-office is one of several
locations where goods or services are delivered, the "facts and circumstances" test in con-
junction with the majority's comparative analysis should be applied to determine a tax-
payer's principal place of business. Id.
159. Id. at 711. Had the respondent incurred those same expenses in any other place,
the deduction would have been allowed. Id.
160. Id. at 712; see Rita Marie Cain and Larry R. Garrison, Home Office Deductions
After Soliman, 31 AM. Bus. L. J. 397, 409 (1993) (stating that because of the majority
opinion in Soliman, "taxpayers incurring comparable business expenses will receive differ-
ent deduction treatment depending on the nature of their business and where it is con-
ducted, not on the nature of the claimed deduction"). An example demonstrates how
similarly situated taxpayers would be treated inequitably:
[A] physician who must go to a hospital to deliver most services would be denied
the home office deduction, whereas another physician who did the same work but
was wealthy enough to own property with a separate structure on it would be able
to take the home office deduction under I.R.C. § 280A(c)(1)(C). Similarly, if a
physician could render services to patients at the home office, the home office
deduction could be taken under I.R.C. § 280A(c)(1)(B).
Joan M. Harvath, Note, Home Office Deduction Narrowed: Commissioner v. Soliman, 113
S. Ct. 701 (1993), 77 MARO. L. REv. 179, 190 n.100 (1993). Justice Stevens reminded the
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Congress enacted § 280A both to clarify the rules of deduction and to
eliminate deductions for home-offices that do not qualify as necessary
business expenses.
161
Breaking § 280A(c)(1) into what he saw as its three major components,
Justice Stevens concluded that the respondent satisfied each one and,
therefore, should have been allowed to deduct expenses incurred in his
home-office. 162 First, the respondent used the home-office exclusively for
a business purpose. 163 Second, the respondent used the home-office on a
regular basis.' 64 Justice Stevens noted that spending two or three hours
in a home-office communicating with patients and surgeons, performing
bookkeeping, and preparing for procedures was sufficient to constitute
use of the home-office on a regular basis. 165 Justice Stevens criticized the
majority's analysis of the third component, which required that the space
be used as a place of business in one of three ways: (1) as the principal
place of business for a taxpayer's trade or business; (2) as a place to meet
clients or patients; or (3) as a separate structure, other than a home, used
in connection with the taxpayer's trade or business. 166 Justice Stevens
noted that the principal place of business exception was written specifi-
cally to allow deductions for those home-offices in which the taxpayer
does not meet patients or clients, but nevertheless uses it for business
purposes.
67
By suggesting that Soliman was denied a home-office deduction be-
cause he failed to meet patients in his home, Justice Stevens reasoned
that the majority merged the meeting patients and clients exception with
majority that Congress enacted § 280A to provide deductions only for legitimate business
expenses incurred in a taxpayer's home-office. Soliman, 113 S. Ct. at 711 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
161. Soliman, 113 S. Ct. at 712 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens stated that Con-
gress did not intend "to discourage parents from working at home; to promote the con-
struction of office buildings or separate structures on residential real estate; or to
encourage hospitals to keep doctors near their patients." Id.
162. Id. at 715.
163. See I.R.C. § 280A(c)(1) (1988) (providing that in addition to satisfying one of the
exceptions under § 280A(c), a taxpayer must also use the home-office exclusively to ad-
vance a business purpose). Justice Stevens interpreted the phrase "exclusive use" as re-
quiring that the use of the home-office be "substantial." Soliman, 113 S. Ct. at 713
(Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens stated that this requirement, alone, eliminated
many of the abuses associated with the appropriate and helpful test because the taxpayer
must now appropriate a separately identifiable space to his business. Id.
164. See I.R.C. § 280A(c)(1) (requiring that the home-office be used on a regular
basis).
165. Soliman, 113 S. Ct. at 713 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens concluded that
Soliman satisfied the first and second criteria. Id.
166. I.R.C. § 280A(c)(1).
167. Soliman, 113 S. Ct. at 714 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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the principal place of business exception, thus eliminating the principal
place of business exception from § 280A. 16 8 Justice Stevens added that
interpreting the statute in this manner renders the meeting patients and
clients exception more significant than the principal place of business ex-
ception.'69 This interpretation of the statute was inconsistent with con-
gressional intent. 170
Justice Stevens favored the approach used by the Tax Court and the
Fourth Circuit, which required that: (1) the home-office be used exclu-
sively and regularly as a home-office; (2) the home-office be essential to
the taxpayer's business; and (3) no other office space be available to the
taxpayer to carry out his business activities. 7 ' Because the office in the
respondent's residence was essential to performing the administrative
tasks associated with being an anesthesiologist and because the respon-
dent was not provided with an office at any of the hospitals, Justice Ste-
vens argued that the home-office was maintained for the respondent's
business and thus qualified as his principal place of business.' 72
III. UNCERTAINTY, INCONSISTENCY, AND UNFAIRNESS RESULT FROM
COMMISSIONER V. SOLIMAN
In Commissioner v. Soliman, the Supreme Court resolved the con-
flict that existed among the Tax Court, the circuit courts, and the Internal
Revenue Service regarding the appropriate standard for determining
whether a taxpayer's home-office qualifies as a principal place of business
by establishing a two-part test.' 74 The Court, however, also incorporated
by reference the focal point test applied by the lower courts, which the
majority held might be significant in determining a taxpayer's principal
168. Id. The majority's relative importance requirement merges the principal place of
business exception with the meeting clients exception. Id. The dissent stated that injecting
the meeting patients exception into the principal place of business exception "renders the
latter alternative entirely superfluous." Id.
169. Id. (declaring that this interpretation "sets the three subsections on unequal
footing").
170. Id. The dissent asserted that:
[t]he meaning of 'principal place of business' may not be absolutely clear, but it
is absolutely clear that a taxpayer may deduct costs associated with his home of-
fice if it is his principal place of business or if it is a place of business used by
patients in the normal course of his business or if it is located in a separate struc-
ture used in connection with his business.
Id.
171. Id. at 715 (stating that the test applied by those two courts "is both true to the
statute and practically incapable of abuse"). According to Justice Stevens, "a principal
place of business is a place maintained by or (in the rare case) for the business." Id.
172. Id.
173. 113 S. Ct. 701 (1993).
174. Id. at 706.
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place of business.175 This holding will have a considerable impact on the
courts' future analyses of home-office deductions and also will impact
taxpayers' ability to claim a home-office deduction. 176  In particular,
Soliman will further confuse lower courts as they attempt to apply the
appropriate standard for determining a taxpayer's principal place of busi-
ness while staying within the confines of the Supreme Court's opinion.1
77
175. Id. Although the Court disliked the focal point test because the "phrase has a
metaphorical quality that can be misleading," the majority held that the focal point, the
point where services are rendered 'or goods are delivered, "must be given great weight in
determining the place where the most important functions are performed." Id.; see
Harvath, supra note 160, at 187 (stating that because of the Court's emphasis on where
services are rendered and goods are delivered, the location where these activities are car-
ried out apparently will be the most important location, and thus, the principal place of a
taxpayer's business).
176. Richard Thomas Lauer, Note, A New Standard for the Home Office Deduction?,
62 U. CIN. L. REv. 765, 779 (1993). Although predicting a dramatic impact on deserving
taxpayers, Lauer does not see Soliman as having a tremendous impact on lower courts'
analysis. Id. Under the Court's two-part test, lower courts will continue to use the facts
and circumstances test when the taxpayer's business generates income inside and outside
the home. Id. at 781. In addition, where the taxpayer's business generates income exclu-
sively at a location outside the home-office, that location will be the principal place of
business. Id. That location is the point where services and goods are delivered and must
be given great weight in determining a taxpayer's principal place of business. Id. But see
Glenn M. Fortin, Commissioner v. Soliman: Supreme Court's Narrow Interpretation of
"Principal Place of Business" Signals Need to Amend Home Office Deduction, 27 GA. L.
REV. 939, 950 (1993) (arguing that the Court's new test is unsatisfactory, confusing, and
unfair); Harvath, supra note 160, at 180 (arguing that the standard outlined in Soliman will
make it more difficult for deserving taxpayers to take home-office deductions and will lead
to increased litigation for clarification of the new standard).
177. See supra notes 139-52 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's new stan-
dard). In two subsequent cases, the Tax Court followed, and did not criticize, the Soliman
decision. Crawford v. Commissioner, 65 T.C.M. (CCH) 2540,2544 (1993); Bowles v. Com-
missioner, 65 T.C.M. (CCH) 2733 (1993).
Three months after the decision in Soliman, the Tax Court considered whether an in-
dependent contractor in the medical field, was entitled to a home-office deduction. Craw-
ford, 65 T.C.M. at 2541. The taxpayer provided medical services for three or four local
hospitals in Dallas, Texas. Id. The taxpayer maintained a home-office to perform follow-
up work for patients, draft correspondence, and conduct other work-related activities. Id.
at 2542. The Tax Court, accepting the Supreme Court's new subjective test, disallowed the
home-office deduction holding that the taxpayer spent much more time at the various hos-
pitals than he did in his home-office. Id. at 2544. The Tax Court, in keeping with the
Supreme Court's decision, refused to consider the availability of alternative office space as
a factor in determining whether the home-office qualified as the principal place of busi-
ness. See id at 2544-45.
In Bowles, the taxpayer was a studio photographer employed by the Texas Youth Com-
mission to teach art to violent juveniles. 65 T.C.M. at 2733. The taxpayer maintained a
home-office for drawing and preparing lesson plans and used his bathroom for developing
photographs. Id. The Tax Court denied the taxpayer a home-office deduction concluding
that his home-office activities were secondary to his activities as a teacher with the Texas
Youth Commission. Id. at 2734.
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In addition, the result will unfairly penalize deserving taxpayers who wish
to claim a deduction for expenses attributable to their home-offices.
178
A. The Soliman Standard
Congress enacted § 280A to provide more definitive rules regarding
the correct standard for determining whether expenses attributable to
business use of the home are deductible. 179 Rather than provide more
definitive rules, however, the Supreme Court implemented a two-part
test and failed to provide adequate guidelines for its application.'8 0 For
example, in assessing the relative importance of the activities performed
at each of the taxpayer's business locations, the Court suggested that an
"objective description of the business "181 be undertaken as a preliminary
step which ultimately would show a "pattern" of significant activity.'
82
These terms are ambiguous, and because the Court provides little gui-
dance in applying them, the Court fails to comport with congressional
intent in providing more definitive rules in the area of home-office
deductions.'
8 3
What little instruction the Court does provide remarkably resembles
the focal point test."8 The Court concluded that if a taxpayer's relatively
important activities include delivering goods or services or meeting pa-
tients or clients, the place where that contact occurs should be given great
weight in determining a taxpayer's principal place of business.
185
178. See infra notes 198-99 and accompanying text (discussing the dramatic impact the
Court's new standard will have on taxpayers deserving of a home-office deduction).
179. See supra notes 5-26 and accompanying text (discussing the legislative history of
§ 280A).
180. Soliman v. Commissioner, 113 S. Ct. 701, 706 (1993). Courts may have difficulty
applying the Supreme Court's two-part test because the Court failed to specify whether the
relative importance test and the time test are of equal significance or whether one test has
priority over the other. See supra notes 153-55 and accompanying text (discussing Justice
Thomas' concern that problems may arise because of the majority's failure to prioritize the
two-part test).
181. Soliman, 113 S. Ct. at 706.
182. Id. A taxpayer's principal place of business would be the location in which those
significant activities were performed. Id.
183. Gary Scott Hulsey, Note, Soliman Leaves Uncertainty in the Area of Home Office
Deductions: Suggested Guidelines, 46 TAX LAW. 947, 953 (1993). The Court concluded
that treating patients was "the essence of [Soliman's] professional service." Id. The Court
did not explain, however, why treating patients was Soliman's most important function. Id.
Hulsey further criticizes the Court's new test because it is inconsistent with Congress' in-
tent in providing more definitive rules regarding home office deductions. Id.
184. Soliman, 113 S. Ct. at 706 (holding that "the point where goods and services are
delivered must be given great weight in determining the place where the most important
functions are performed"); cf supra notes 79-99 and accompanying text (discussing the
focal point test).
185. Soliman, 113 S. Ct. at 706.
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Although the Court rejected the focal point test because "no one test is
determinative," 186 it would appear that the Court is applying the focal
point test to satisfy its relative importance test.187 Inclusion of the focal
point test created by the Tax Court undermines the importance of the
new two-part test created by the Soliman majority and places additional
burdens on the lower courts in applying the appropriate standard.188 The
majority's arguable application of the focal point test deprives the three
exceptions set forth in § 280A(c)(1) of equal significance. 189 By holding
that the place where the taxpayer meets patients, clients, or customers is
an important factor in determining the taxpayer's principal place of busi-
ness, the majority injected the meeting patients exception into the princi-
pal place of business exception.' 9° This suggests that the principal place
of business exception will apply only if it is accompanied by the meeting
patients exception. Such an approach is inconsistent with what Congress
intended when it enacted § 280A.191
If Congress had intended to make the principal place of business ex-
ception dependent on the meeting patients exception, Congress would
have incorporated the meeting patients exception into the principal place
of business exception rather than creating three separate and individual
exceptions. 92 Because Congress did not draft the statute in such a man-
ner, it is inappropriate for the majority to interpret the statute as impos-
ing such a limitation.'
93
186. Id.
187. Id. Before introducing the new test, the majority held that it is not possible to
"develop an objective formula that yields a clear answer in every case." Id.
188. Id. at 709 (Thomas, J., concurring). Proponents of the focal point test argue that
the test is objective and satisfies congressional intent. See Charles M. Flesch, Note, Em-
ployed Artists' Home Office Deductions in the Aftermath of Weissman v. Commissioner:
The Second Circuit's New Limited Exception for Taxpayer-Employees, 4 CARDOZO ARTS
& ENT. L. J. 337, 348 (1985) (arguing that the "focal point standard comports with the
congressional intent to objectify the inquiry under which a determination to permit a home
office deduction is to be made"); Mark T. Holtschneider, Comment, Putting the House in
Order: An Analysis of and Planning Considerations for Home Office Deduction, 14 U.
BALT. L. REV. 522, 531 (1985) (arguing that the focal point test comports with Congress'
intent in enacting § 280A, but admitting that the test's emphasis on objectivity "frustrate[s]
most taxpayer claims").
189. Soliman, 113 S. Ct. at 714 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
190. Id.; see supra notes 168-70 and accompanying text (noting that Justice Stevens
declared that the focal point test was rejected because the test, "merges the 'principal place
of business' exception with the 'meeting clients' exception").
191. Soliman, 113 S. Ct. at 714-15 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
192. Id. Justice Stevens argued that Congress intended only to prevent deductions for
home-offices that were not genuinely necessary business expenses. Id. at 712.
193. Id.
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The two-part test advanced by the majority also includes assessing the
time spent at each of the taxpayer's business locations.194 The Court does
not clarify, however, whether this time test is equally important as the
activities test or whether the time test is applicable only when the relative
importance of the activities test yields no definitive answer. 195 Whether
these two tests are equally significant is especially important in those
cases where the taxpayer's income is earned at a separate business loca-
tion but the majority of the taxpayer's time is spent in the home-office. 96
The majority's lack of guidance as to the proper application of the two-
part test is inconsistent with Congress' intent to provide more definitive
rules in the area of home-office deductions. 97
The Supreme Court's new standard tightly enforces the test for deter-
mining whether a taxpayer's home-office qualifies as the principal place
of business. 198 As a result, taxpayers who would have qualified for the
194. Id. at 706.
195. Id. at 709 (Thomas, J., concurring) (finding the majority's two-part test troubling
because of the majority's lack of clarity in how to properly apply the test). Due to this lack
of clarity, Justices Thomas and Scalia were "at a loss" in predicting the outcome of the case
if the taxpayer had spent the majority of his time in his home-office rather than at the
hospital. Id. at 711.
196. See Hulsey, supra note 183, at 953-54. Hulsey illustrated the difficulty of applying
the Court's two-part test with the decision of Drucker v. Commissioner, 715 F.2d 67 (2d
Cir. 1983). Id. The taxpayer, in Drucker, spent substantially more time in his home-office
than he did at the performance hall where he earned his income. Drucker v. Commis-
sioner, 715 F.2d 67, 69 (2d Cir. 1983). If it was determined that the performance hall was
the taxpayer's principal place of business, it is unclear whether the time test would be a
consideration. See Hulsey, supra note 183, at 955. It is not clear how the Soliman test
would resolve this type of situation. Id.; see also Harvath, supra note 160, at 193 (arguing
that it is unclear how many hours Soliman would have to spend in his home-office in order
for the home-office to qualify as his principal place of business). The Internal Revenue
Service has stated that spending approximately 70% of the time in the home-office might
make a taxpayer eligible for the home-office deduction. I.R.S. Notice 93-12, 1993-1 C.B.
46-7; see Harvath, supra note 160, at 193 (questioning whether 70% will suffice if the tax-
payer's most important business activities are performed outside the home-office).
197. See Hulsey, supra note 183, at 954-55 (arguing that the decision in Soliman fails to
provide the definitiveness and clarity that Congress intended); see also Harvath, supra note
160, at 190-91 (asserting that "[t]he Supreme Court's comparative analysis in Commis-
sioner v. Soliman is an ineffective method of bringing fairness and consistency to the deter-
mination of a taxpayer's principal place of business for I.R.C. section 280A purposes")
(citations omitted).
198. Harvath, supra note 160, at 190-91; see Home Office Deduction Claim Must Hurdle
a Comparative Analysis, Justices Rule, U.S.L.W., Jan. 15, 1993 (daily ed.) (predicting that
the Court's new test will "disqualify [ ] numerous taxpayers who would have enjoyed the
deduction under a looser test crafted by the Tax Court"); see Harvath, supra note 160, at
193. The Supreme Court's decision is likely to have a negative impact on certain types of
business persons, such as health care professionals, the self-employed, construction con-
tractors, outside salespeople, musicians, house painters, consultants, caterers, and interior
decorators. Id.
Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 45:275
deduction under the Tax Court's more liberal test now are ineligible from
deducting business expenses incurred in the home.'99 The Internal Reve-
nue Service reacted quickly to the Court's new decision when they with-
drew a portion of a 1983 regulation concerning home-office deductions to
reflect the Supreme Court's decision.2 0 0 The Supreme Court, like the In-
ternal Revenue Service, favored a strict construction of the principal
place of business determination, and it is expected that, because of this
199. Reaction to Soliman was immediate with commentators claiming that the new
standard would adversely affect thousands of taxpayers, especially those who did some of
their work at home, but provided their services at other locations. See, e.g., Robert L.
Gardner et al., Has the Supreme Court's Decision in Soliman Resolved the Home Office
Controversy?, 21 J. REAL EST. TAX'N 13, 25 (1993) (arguing that taxpayers who use home-
offices will find it difficult to meet the Soliman principal place of business test); Michael M.
Megaard and Susan L. Megaard, Supreme Court Narrows Home Office Deductions in
Soliman, 78 J. TAX'N 132 (1993) (stating that the Court's new standard "may be read as
closing the door on home office deductions for most taxpayers"); Lynn Asinof, How
Supreme Court's Home-Office Ruling Affects You, WALL ST. J., Jan. 13, 1993, at C1 (stating
that the taxpayers most likely to be affected include doctors, contractors, home decorators,
caterers, computer repairers, house painters, consultants, and personal trainers); Joan Bis-
kupic, Supreme Court Rules Taxpayers Cannot Deduct Some Home Offices; Decision Seen
as Defeat for Consultants, Independent Contractors, WASH. POST, Jan. 13, 1993, at A3 (stat-
ing that the ruling is likely to affect teachers, musicians, and medical workers "whose work
takes them away from an office, into a classroom, theater or hospital"); Elizabeth M. Mac-
Donald, How to Write Off a Home Office, MONEY, Mar. 1993, at 16 (believing that the
Supreme Court, in Soliman, "basically rewrote the rules for home office deductions ....
The likeliest to suffer: the self-employed and people who do some of their work at home
and the rest elsewhere").
200. Rev. Rul. 94-24, 1994-15 I.R.B. 5 (providing that the time test becomes more im-
portant if the relative importance test yields no definitive answer to the principal place of
business). The Ruling also illustrated how the I.R.S. was going to apply the new standard
outlined in Soliman by providing four examples. Id. at 6. In the first example, a plumber
who spends 40 hours a week at customer locations and 10 hours in his home-office will be
denied a home-office deduction because the essence of his business involves performing
services and delivering goods at his customers' locations. Id. The activities in his home-
office are secondary to the services he renders to his customers. Id. In the second exam-
ple, a school teacher, who maintains a home-office to prepare for class and grade papers, is
denied a deduction because the activities performed in the home-office, although impor-
tant, are less important than the teacher's activities at school. Id. In the third example, an
author who spends 30 to 35 hours a week in his home-office writing and 10 to 15 hours a
week at other locations conducting research and meeting with publishers, will be able to
deduct expenses attributable to the home-office because the essence of the taxpayer's busi-
ness is writing. Id. In the fourth example, a self employed retailer spends 25 hours a week
in his home-office ordering costume jewelry, shipping orders, and keeping the books. Id.
He spends 15 hours a week at craft shows selling his merchandise. Id. The I.R.S. would
consider the home-office to be the principal place of business. Id. Because the taxpayer's
most important activities occur at more than one location, the time test becomes more
important than a comparison of the relative importance of the activities. Id.
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showing of Supreme Court support, the Internal Revenue Service will be
more resolute in challenging home-office deductions.2 '
B. The Facts and Circumstances Test: Fair to Taxpayers and Consistent
with § 280A
The facts and circumstances test 20 2 provides the clearest interpretation
of § 280A, while affording favorable tax treatment to taxpayers who incur
valid home-office expenses in connection with their trade or business.
20 3
To satisfy the facts and circumstances test, the activities performed in the
home-office must be essential to the taxpayer's business; the taxpayer
201. See Neal St. Anthony, Key Question: Where is Money Earned?, STAR TRIB., Feb.
14, 1993, at D4 (stating that "[b]y receiving the Supreme Court's support, the I.R.S. can
continue to try to stem abuses even though the court specifically noted that other cases
would be determined by their own circumstances"); Pam Yip, For Office Claims, I.R.S.
Leaves No Home Unturned, Hous. CHRON., Feb. 22, 1993, at 1B, 2B (quoting an I.R.S.
spokesperson as saying, "[Tihe home office deduction automatically pushes an alert button
on I.R.S. computers"). Legislators, sympathetic to the position of taxpayers, have pro-
posed legislation to overturn the Supreme Court's decision in Soliman and restore full
deductibility to home-office expenses. Sen. Hatch Proposes to Restore Full Deductibility of
Home Office Expenses, DAILY EXEC. REP. (BNA), Mar. 14, 1994, at G-1 ("propos[ing]
legislation [that] would allow a home office to meet the definition of principal place of
business if it is the location where essential administrative or management activities are
conducted on a regular and systematic basis," but requiring that the taxpayer have no
other location for the performing of these activities). In addition to Congress' desire to
restore full deductibility to home-office expenses, 16 trade associations are supporting leg-
islation to ease home-office deduction restrictions, claiming that " 'home-based businesses
have served the economy and the work force well.' " Trade Associations Push for Easing
of Home Office Deduction Restrictions, DAILY EXEC. REP. (BNA), Jan. 13, 1994, at G-4.
Specifically, the legislation would allow expenses incurred in the home-offices used regu-
larly and exclusively for business purposes to be deductible. Sen. Hatch Proposes to Re-
store Full Deductibility of Home Office Expenses, supra, at G-1. The legislation, intended
to benefit small business owners and self-employed individuals, would, thus, keep in place
the criteria that was applied prior to Soliman and would add an additional requirement
that the taxpayer have no other location for the performance of administrative activities.
Linda Stern, Reclaim Your Lost Deduction, HOME OFFICE COMPUTING, Apr. 1994, at 22
(detailing provisions of proposed bill and reasoning that many senators were eager to cos-
ponsor the measure after realizing the number of constituents who work from home).
202. See supra notes 121-33 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's application
of the factors comprising the "facts and circumstances" test).
203. See Levine, supra note 4, at 261 (arguing that because the focal point test is too
rigid and the dominant portion of the work test is inconsistent with congressional intent,
the facts and circumstances test is the only test that is both fair and consistent with legisla-
tive history); see also Fortin, supra note 176, at 955 (arguing that the facts and circum-
stances test, unlike the focal point and time comparison tests, provides a broader analysis
in determining whether a home-office deduction is appropriate because it considers all
relevant facts and circumstances).
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must spend a substantial amount of time in the home-office; and there
can be no other office space available to perform the activities.
204
While this test has been criticized as being as liberal as the appropriate
and helpful test,205 it is much more difficult to prove that use of a home-
office is essential to a taxpayer's business, than it is to prove that a home-
office is appropriate and helpful to a taxpayer's business.20 6 Thus, the
facts and circumstances test allows home-office expense deductions for
legitimate claims and eliminates those home-office expense deductions
for claims that are nonessential to the taxpayer's business.20 7
The facts and circumstances test is also consistent with the congres-
sional intent in enacting § 280A.208 By eliminating the home-office de-
duction in those cases where the home-office was used only occasionally
or incidentally to further a taxpayer's business, Congress intended the
home-office deduction to be available only where an office was used ex-
clusively for carrying out the taxpayer's business. 20 9 The facts and cir-
cumstances test fulfills Congress' intent because to satisfy the test the
taxpayer must have no other office space available to conduct the tax-
payer's business activities and the home-office must be essential to the
204. Soliman v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 20, 27-28 (1990), aff'd, 935 F.2d 52, 54 (4th Cir.
1991), and rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 701 (1993).
205. See Fortin, supra note 176, at 959. Fortin asserts that:
[Tihe 'facts and circumstances' test goes far beyond a mere inquiry into whether
the home office is 'helpful and appropriate'- under the latter test, taxpayers
could qualify for a deduction merely by bringing some work home at night. These
abuses would not survive judicial scrutiny under the 'facts and circumstances'




207. See Levine, supra note 4, at 258-60. For example, a taxpayer has an office down-
town but also maintains a home-office. Under the appropriate and helpful test, the tax-
payer would be allowed a deduction if he could show that he used the home-office on
evenings and weekends and that the home-office was appropriate and helpful to the tax-
payer's business. See id. at 248-50. However, a deduction would not be granted under the
facts and circumstances test because the home-office is not essential to the taxpayer's busi-
ness. Id.
208. See Levine, supra note 4, at 261 (arguing that Congress's efforts at preventing
deductions for incidental or occasional business use is met by the facts and circumstances
test which requires a substantial business exigency for having the home-office). One of
Congress's primary goals in enacting § 280A was to prevent taxpayers from taking a home-
office deduction when they brought work home from their employer-provided offices. S.
REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 147 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3439,
3580.
209. S. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1,149 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3439, 3582.
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taxpayer's business.21° If the taxpayer has access to office space outside
the taxpayer's home, or if the home-office is used only occasionally in
connection with the taxpayer's business, the taxpayer will fail to satisfy
the criteria of the facts and circumstances test.
211
IV. CONCLUSION
Although the Supreme Court in Soliman addressed the issue of what
constitutes a taxpayer's principal place of business in determining
whether a taxpayer can deduct expenses attributable to a home office, the
Court has left many questions unanswered. The Court's opinion in
Soliman will foster inconsistency with the statutory law and will unfairly
penalize taxpayers who meet the qualifications of § 280A and deserve a
home-office deduction. Justice Stevens' support of the facts and circum-
stances test is more sound because it foresees the ramifications of the
majority's holding on the future of home-office deductions. With a grow-
ing number of self-employed taxpayers managing businesses from home-
offices, there is a need for assistance and encouragement in deducting
legitimate and essential business expenses incurred in the home.
Elizabeth Diane Soscia
210. Soliman v. Commissioner, 935 F.2d 52, 54 (4th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 701
(1993).
211. Id. Application of the facts and circumstances test to Drucker v. Commissioner,
715 F.2d 67, 68-69 (2d Cir. 1983), demonstrates that this test is fair to the taxpayer and is
consistent with Congress' intent in enacting § 280A. A concert musician spent more time
in his home music studio practicing for performances than he spent performing at the Lin-
coln Center because his employer did not provide practice facilities. Id. Drucker satisfies
the facts and circumstances test because the home music studio was essential to the tax-
payer's business. If he did not practice, he would not perform well and would probably
lose his job. Id In addition, Drucker spent a substantial amount of time, approximately 30
hours per week, in the home studio practicing. Id. at 68. Lastly, because Drucker's em-
ployer did not provide him with practice facilities, he had no other available space, except
his home, to practice. Id. at 69.
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